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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of strategic network formation with local com-
plementarities in eﬀort levels and positive local externalities for a general class of payoﬀ
functions. Results are obtained for one-sided and two-sided link creation. In both cases
(pairwise) Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs, which are a strict subset
of core-periphery networks. The relevance of the convexity of the value function (gross
payoﬀs as a function of neighbors' eﬀort levels when best responding) in obtaining nested
split graphs is highlighted. Under additional assumptions on payoﬀs, we show that the
only eﬃcient networks are the complete and the empty network. Furthermore, there
exists a range of linking cost such that any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient
and for a strict subset of this range any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium network structure
is diﬀerent from the eﬃcient network. These ﬁndings are relevant for a wide range
of social and economic phenomena, such as educational attainment, criminal activity,
labor market participation, and R&D expenditures of ﬁrms.
Key Words: Strategic network formation, peer eﬀects, strategic complements,
positive externalities. JEL Codes: D62, D85.
1 Introduction
Peer eﬀects and social structure play an important role in determining individual behavior
and aggregate outcomes in many social and economic settings. This has been documented
by a large body of empirical work, which ﬁnds peer eﬀects and network position crucial for
decisions concerning educational attainment, criminal activity, labor market participation
∗I am grateful to my supervisors Fernando Vega-Redondo and Massimo Morelli for their support and
guidance. I also thank Sebastian Bervoets, Sergio Currarini, Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, In-Uck Park,
Paolo Pin, Brian Rogers, Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr and participants of the Networks Working Group at the
European University Institute, the UECE Lisbon Meetings 2010 and the CTN 2013 for helpful comments.
All remaining errors are mine. Contact: timo.hiller@bristol.ac.uk, Address: Department of Economics,
University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Road, BS81TN, UK.
1
and R&D expenditures of ﬁrms. In these settings an agent's optimal action and payoﬀ is
thought to depend directly on the action or payoﬀ of others (peer eﬀects), while the relevant
reference group is determined by the network of bilateral relationships between agents (social
structure).
This paper endogenizes the network in a setting which accounts for peer eﬀects. In accor-
dance with empirical studies, peer eﬀects are assumed to induce positive local externalities
and strategic complementarities.1 The setup is simple. Agents simultaneously choose a
non-negative, continuous eﬀort level and create links at a cost. The signiﬁcance of a link
is that direct neighbors in the network beneﬁt from each other's eﬀort levels (positive lo-
cal externalities) and an agent's incentive to exert eﬀort is strictly increasing in the sum
of his neighbor's eﬀort levels (strict strategic complementarities). Furthermore, we assume
payoﬀ functions for which the corresponding value function is convex. That is, when best
responding, own payoﬀs are convex in the sum of eﬀort levels of direct neighbors. Results
for two speciﬁcations of the model are presented. First, two-sided link formation, where
linking cost are shared equally. For this case we solve for pairwise Nash equilibrium, which
reﬂects the bilateral nature of creating a link (and sharing its cost). Second, one-sided link
formation, where linking cost are borne unilaterally. This speciﬁcation allows us to employ
Nash equilibrium.2
For both, one-sided and two-sided link formation, we show that equilibrium networks
are nested split graphs, a special case of core-periphery networks.3 Core-periphery structures
are frequently observed in empirical work on networks.4 More recently, nested split graphs
have gained increased attention and empirical support has been established in a variety of
contexts.5 Typically, some agents in the periphery are connected to agents in the core and we
1See Hoxby (2000), Sacerdote (2001) for a treatment of peer eﬀects in education, Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman (1996), Case and Katz (1991) and Ludwig et al (2001) for criminal and delinquent behavior,
Topa (2001) and Conley and Topa (2001) for labor markets and Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) and Levin
and Reiss (1988) for R&D expenditure of ﬁrms.
2Pairwise Nash equilibrium was ﬁrst discussed in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). For applications see, for
example, Goyal and Joshi (2003) and Belleﬂamme and Bloch (2004). The one-sided speciﬁcation follows
Bala and Goyal (2000).
3There are varying deﬁnitions of core-periphery networks in the social sciences literature. Typically, a
core-periphery structure indicates the existence of one group that is internally densely connected and another
group that is internally sparsely connected (Borgatti and Everett (1999)). We follow the deﬁnition given in
Bramoullé (2007): A core-periphery network is such that the set of agents can be partitioned into two sets,
called the core and the periphery, where all agents in the core are connected to each other, while no pair of
agents in the periphery is connected. A nested split graph is a graph such that, if the link between i and l
exists and the degree of k is at least as high as the degree of l, then the link between i and k also exists.
All nested split graphs are core-periphery networks, while the converse is not true. For a detailed account
of nested split graphs see Mahadev and Peled (1995).
4Empirical examples of core-periphery networks relevant to this paper are Adamic and Adam (2003) for
friendship, Canter (2004) for crime and Powell et al (1996), Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) and Baker et al
(2004) for R&D networks.
5See Akerman and Larsson (2010) for an example in global arms trade and May et al (2008) for networks
of banks. König, Tessone and Zenou (2012) provide a discussion of nested split graphs with further references
and empirical evidence, brieﬂy discussed below.
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therefore investigate the possibility of such equilibria to arise. For the case of linear-quadratic
payoﬀs we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a star network
for both link formation speciﬁcations. Turning again to the more general class of payoﬀ
functions, we show that eﬀort levels and gross payoﬀs are higher for more central agents. This
is in accordance with the empirical literature on networks.6 Perhaps surprisingly, however,
if link formation is two-sided, then the center of a star may obtain strictly lower net payoﬀs
(i.e., net of linking cost). In these equilibria higher linking cost outweigh higher gross payoﬀs.
Finally, we provide results for social welfare and show that, if own payoﬀs are weakly convex
in eﬀort levels of neighbors, then the only eﬃcient network structures are the empty and
the complete network. Moreover, there exists a range of linking cost for which all (pairwise)
Nash equilibria are ineﬃcient. For a strict subset of this range not only is any (pairwise)
Nash equilibrium ineﬃcient, but also any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium network structure
is diﬀerent from the eﬃcient network. Note that the range of linking cost for which any
(pairwise) Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient may be thought of as large, in the sense that a
(pairwise) Nash equilibrium may only be eﬃcient if the network is empty.
Two empirical papers that are closely related are Calvó-Armengol, Pattacchini and Zenou
(2005 and 2009). The authors use a detailed data set on friendship networks in U.S. high
schools (AddHealth) to test a structural model on a ﬁxed network. This allows for the
measurement of peer eﬀects in education and delinquent behavior, respectively. Calvó-
Armengol et al ﬁnd a positive relationship between grades and delinquency rates on the one
hand and centrality on the other hand. Network position turns out to be a key determinant
for an individual's eﬀort level. This emphasizes the importance of social structure for peer
inﬂuences, as opposed to average in-group eﬀects. In both papers positive local spillovers
and strategic complementarities in eﬀort levels are observed. Note that the payoﬀ function
in Calvó-Armengol et al (2005 and 2009) is the same as the one in the linear-quadratic case
presented here and we therefore endogenize the network for these papers.
The one-sided speciﬁcation presented in our paper can be seen as the conceptual counter-
part to Galeotti and Goyal (2010). They also solve a simultaneous move game, where agents
choose a non-negative, continuous eﬀort level and link formation is one-sided. Externalities
are positive and local, but diﬀerent from our paper, Galeotti and Goyal (2010) assume strate-
gic substitutes. The only strict equilibria in their paper are core-periphery networks, where
agents in the periphery extend links to agents in the core. Note that the star network, for
which we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions, is a special case of the core-periphery
structures obtained in Galeotti and Goyal (2010). We thereby show that core-periphery net-
works, in which agents in the periphery are connected to agents in the core, are not a feature
6Baldwin et al (1997) ﬁnds grades to be positively correlated with centrality for students of an MBA
course. Lin (2001) analyzes job market data and links centrality to obtaining better job oﬀers. Powell et al
(1996) and Ahuja (2000) show that more central ﬁrms tend to issue more patents, have higher earnings and
a lower probability of going bankrupt.
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of strategic substitutes alone, but may also be obtained under strategic complementarities.7
The model presented by Baetz (2012) is also related. Baetz' setup is as in the one-sided
link formation speciﬁcation of our paper, but instead of payoﬀ functions with a convex value
function, Baetz (2012) assumes payoﬀ functions such that the corresponding value function
is concave. A full characterization is not available yet. It can be shown, however, that a
wide range of equilibria may be sustained in equilibrium, such as regular networks, biregular
bipartite graphs, multipartite graphs, and (under fairly restrictive assumptions on payoﬀs)
also core-periphery networks. That is, if the value function is convex, then all equilibria are
nested split graphs, while if the value function is concave, then many more structures may
arise (under one-sided link formation). To emphasize the relevance of the convexity of the
value function, we indicate in the ﬁnal part of the paper how our equilibrium characterization
extends to the case of strategic substitutes.8 More speciﬁcally, if link formation is one-sided
and the value function is convex, then all Nash equilibria are nested split graphs, irrespective
of the nature of strategic interaction.
A recent paper by König, Tessone, and Zenou (2012) addresses link formation for the
linear-quadratic speciﬁcation. Note that the authors interpret their model as one of ﬁnancial
and trade networks and, of course, their interpretation carries over to our model as well.9
The link formation process in König et al (2012) is very diﬀerent from the one presented
here. The setup is dynamic and in each time period players play a two-stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, agents choose their eﬀort levels on a ﬁxed network, while in the second stage a
randomly selected player may create a new link in the current network, at zero cost. Links
decay over time, with more valuable links decaying at a slower rate. König et al (2012)
then introduce noise into the model and derive the stochastically stable networks. These
are shown to be nested split graphs. The authors test their model using four diﬀerent data
sets (two banking networks, a global trade network and an arms trade network) and ﬁnd
evidence for nestedness and an overall good ﬁt.
Finally, the paper by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) is also related. Again
the presence of a link in the network (after a payoﬀ decomposition) allows agents to beneﬁt
from each other's eﬀort levels and payoﬀs are linear-quadratic. Diﬀerent from our paper,
however, Ballester et al (2006) assume not only local strategic complementarities, but also
allow for global strategic substitutes. The authors then link equilibrium actions to Bonacich
7Note that the payoﬀ function in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) is given by pi(xi, yi) = f(xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj)−
c(xi), where f is assumed to be concave and c is linear. By making appropriate assumptions on f and c, we
can generate a model of positive externalities and strategic complements that ﬁts our setup. Arguably the
simplest such speciﬁcation is pi(xi, yi) = (xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj)
2 − x3i .
8Note that in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) the value function is linear as long as own eﬀort level is positive
and strictly concave thereafter.
9See Appendix C in König, Tessone, and Zenou (2012) for a derivation of the linear-quadratic payoﬀ
speciﬁcation in the context of networks of banks operating in loan markets and networks of trade relationships
among countries.
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centrality on a ﬁxed network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the two-sided model
and then presents the analysis. Section 3 concludes. Some of the proofs for the two-sided
speciﬁcation are relegated to Appendix A, while the one-sided model is presented in its
entirety in Appendix B.
2 The Two-Sided Model
2.1 Model Description
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players with n ≥ 3. Each agent i chooses an eﬀort level
xi ∈ X and announces a set of agents to whom he wishes to be linked to, which is represented
by a row vector gi = (gi,1, ..., gi,i−1, gi,i+1, ..., gi,n−1), with gi,j ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ N\{i}.
Assume X = [0,+∞) and gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1}n−1. The set of agent i's strategies is denoted by
Si = X×Gi and the set of strategies of all players by S = S1×S2× ...×Sn. A strategy proﬁle
s = (x,g) ∈ S then speciﬁes the individual eﬀort level for each player, x = (x1, x2, ..., xn),
and the set of intended links, g = (g1,g2, ...,gn). A link between i and j, denoted with
g¯i,j = 1, is created if and only if both agents intend to create a link. That is, g¯i,j = 1 if
gi,j = gj,i = 1, and g¯i,j = 0 otherwise. From g we thereby obtain the undirected graph g¯
with g¯i,j = g¯j,i. The presence of a link g¯i,j = 1 allows players to directly beneﬁt from the
eﬀort level exerted by the respective other agent involved in the link. Let Ni(g) = {j ∈ N :
gi,j = 1} be the set of agents to which agent i extends a link and denote the corresponding
cardinality with ηi(g) = |Ni(g)|. Deﬁne the set of i's neighbors in g¯ (i.e., the set of agents
to which i reciprocates the announcement of a link) with Ni(g¯) = {j ∈ N : g¯i,j = 1} and
deﬁne ηi(g¯) = |Ni(g¯)|. The aggregate eﬀort level of agent i's neighbors in g¯ is written as
yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. We sometimes drop the subscript of yi when it is clear from the context.
Given a network g¯, g¯ + g¯i,j and g¯ − g¯i,j have the following interpretation. When g¯i,j = 0 in
g¯, g¯ + g¯i,j adds the link g¯i,j = 1, while if g¯i,j = 1 in g¯, then g¯ + g¯i,j = g¯. Similarly, if g¯i,j = 1
in g¯, g¯ − g¯i,j deletes the link g¯i,j, while if g¯i,j = 0 in g¯, then g¯ − g¯i,j = g¯. The network is
called empty and denoted with g¯e, if g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N and complete and denoted with g¯c if
g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ N.
Payoﬀs of player i under strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) are given by
Πi(s) = pi(xi, yi)− ηi(g)k,
where k denotes the cost of extending a link, with k > 0. Gross payoﬀs pi(xi, yi) are a
function of own eﬀort, xi, and the sum of eﬀort levels of direct neighbors, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj.
We assume strict positive local externalities and strict strategic complementarities in eﬀort
levels, so that ∂pi(x,y)
∂y
> 0 and ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0. Further assume that ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2x
< 0. The latter
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assumption, together with the convexity of X, guarantees a unique maximizer, which is
denoted by x¯(y). We also assume x¯(y) > 0.10 From ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0 (strict positive externalities)
we know that best response functions are strictly increasing in the sum of eﬀort level accessed,
so that ∂x¯(y)
∂y
> 0. Best response functions are assumed to be either linear or concave, i.e.,
∂2x¯(y)
∂2y
= 0 or ∂
2x¯(y)
∂2y
< 0. Denote the value function with v(y) = pi(x¯(y), y). The value function
yields an agent's gross payoﬀs when best responding to a given sum of eﬀort level accessed.
Throughout we assume v(y) to be convex, ∂
2v(y)
∂2y
> 0. In order to guarantee existence, we
further assume that there exists a value of y such that ∂x¯(y)
∂y
< 1
n−1 .
In the following we deﬁne pairwise Nash equilibrium (PNE). A strategy proﬁle s = (x,g)
is a pairwise Nash equilibrium iﬀ
• s is a Nash Equilibrium, and
• for all g¯i,j = 0, if Πi(x′i, x′j,x−i,−j, g¯ + g¯i,j) > Πi(s), then Πj(x′i, x′j,x−i,−j, g¯ + g¯ij) <
Πj(s), ∀x′i, x′j ∈ X.
A pairwise Nash equilibrium is therefore both, a Nash equilibrium and pairwise stable.
Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of individual payoﬀs. For any strategy proﬁle s, social
welfare is given by
W (s) =
∑
i∈N Πi(s).
A proﬁle s˜ is socially eﬃcient if W (˜s) ≥ W (s), ∀s ∈S.
2.2 Analysis
We start the analysis by providing a proof for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium on a ﬁxed network. For the case of linear best response functions we employ the
existence result provided by Ballester et al (2006). For the case of concave best response
functions we make use of a ﬁxed point theorem provided by Kennan (2001). As in Kennan's
paper, we deﬁne a vector b to be larger than a vector a if and only if bi > ai ∀i ∈ N.
Proposition 1: For any ﬁxed network, g¯, there exists a unique NE in eﬀort levels.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10This assumption guarantees that there does not always, i.e., for any linking cost k, exist a (pairwise)
Nash equilibrium such that the network is empty.
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Lemma 1 shows that agents in a complete component exert equal eﬀort levels.
Lemma 1: NE eﬀort levels are equal for all players in a complete component.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a pair of players k and l in a complete
component, such that x∗k 6= x∗l and, without loss of generality, that x∗k > x∗l . Note that
in a complete component, k and l are connected to the same sets of third agents, such
that Nk(g¯) \ {l} = Nl(g¯) \ {k}. But then, for x∗k > x∗l , the sum of eﬀort levels of l's
neighbors,
∑
j∈Nl(g¯) x
∗
j , is larger than the sum of eﬀort levels of k's neighbors,
∑
j∈Nk(g¯) x
∗
j .We
have reached a contradiction, since due to strict strategic complementarities
∑
j∈Nl(g¯) x
∗
j >∑
j∈Nk(g¯) x
∗
j implies x
∗
l > x
∗
k. Q.E.D.
In Lemma 2 we show that eﬀort levels are maximal in the complete network.
Lemma 2: NE eﬀort levels are maximal in the complete network.
Proof. Denote the Nash equilibrium eﬀort level in the complete network, g¯c, with xc∗.
From Lemma 1 we know that xc∗ = x∗i (g¯
c) ∀i ∈ N . Start by deleting a link g¯i,j from g¯c and
consider each player's best response to xc∗ in g¯c− g¯i,j. Agent i's initial best response will be
lower in g¯c − g¯i,j than in g¯c, as
∑
j∈Ni(g¯c−g¯i,j) x
∗
j <
∑
j∈Ni(g¯c) x
∗
j . Iterating on best responses,
any agent l with g¯∗i,l = 1 decreases his eﬀort level, and those sustaining links with l decrease
their eﬀort levels in turn, and so forth. The eﬀort level of each agent is a decreasing sequence
of real numbers, which is bounded below by x¯(0). Eﬀort levels therefore convergence to a
new equilibrium in g¯c− g¯i,j, with x∗l (g¯c− g¯i,j) < x∗(g¯c) ∀l ∈ N. Note that any network g¯ 6= g¯c
can be obtained from g¯c by deleting a sequence of links. Eﬀort levels are weakly decreasing
at each step and strictly for the deletion of the ﬁrst link in a complete network. Q.E.D.
Next, we deﬁne two cost threshold cost, k1 and k2. The ﬁrst threshold, k1, is given by
the gross marginal payoﬀs (net of linking cost) when a pair of agents creates a link in the
empty network. Note that under pairwise Nash equilibrium we allow both agents creating
a new link to adjust their eﬀort levels. The second threshold, k2, is deﬁned as the average
gross marginal payoﬀs of linking to (n− 1) agents in the complete network. Both thresholds
are expressed in terms of the value function.
Deﬁnition 1: k1 = vi(x
∗
j(g¯
e + g¯i,j))− vi(0) and k2 = v((n−1)x∗(g¯c))−v(0)n−1 .
Proposition 2 shows that, for linking cost smaller than k1, the unique pairwise Nash
equilibrium is the complete network, while for linking cost larger than or equal to k1, there
exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium such that the network is empty. To see this, note that
with strategic complementarities and a convex value function, the marginal value of adding
a link (and adjusting eﬀort levels) is lowest for a pair of agents with no links. That is, if
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linking cost is smaller than k1, then in any network that is not complete, there exists a pair
of agents who ﬁnds it proﬁtable to create a link (and to adjust their eﬀort levels). Therefore,
the unique pairwise Nash equilibrium is the complete network. Conversely, if linking cost is
larger than or equal to k1, then no pair of agents in the empty network ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
create a link (and to adjust their eﬀort levels) and there exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium
such that the network is empty.
Proposition 2: If k < k1, then the unique PNE is the complete network. If k ≥ k1,
then there exists a PNE such that the network is empty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that for linking cost larger than k2, the unique pairwise Nash equi-
librium is the empty network, while for linking cost smaller than or equal to k2, there exists
a pairwise Nash equilibrium such that the network is complete. Note that the (non-empty)
pairwise Nash equilibrium network that can be sustained at the highest linking cost is the
complete network. This follows from strategic complementarities and the convexity of the
value function, together with our results from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, that eﬀort levels are
equal and maximal in the complete network. The threshold value of k2 is such that, if linking
cost is larger than k2, then an agent in the complete network ﬁnds it proﬁtable to delete
his links (and adjust his eﬀort level). The unique pairwise Nash equilibrium is therefore the
empty network. For linking cost smaller than or equal to k2, no agent in the complete net-
work ﬁnds it proﬁtable to sever any subset of links (and to adjust his eﬀort level). Therefore,
there exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium such that the network is complete.
Proposition 3: If k > k2, then the unique PNE is the empty network. If k ≤ k2, then
there exists a PNE such that the network is complete.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that k1 < k2.
Lemma 3: k1 < k2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To summarize, for linking cost smaller than k1, the unique PNE is the complete network,
while for linking cost larger than k2 the unique PNE network is the empty network. For
linking cost k ∈ [k1, k2] the complete and the empty network are pairwise Nash equilibria.
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Next, we formally deﬁne core−periphery networks (which are called split graphs in the
mathematical graph theory literature) and nested split graphs. In a core-periphery network
the set of agents can be partitioned into two sets, such that all pairs of agents within the
ﬁrst set (the core) are connected and no pair of agents within the second set (the periphery)
is connected. Note that the deﬁnition does not state anything about links between pairs of
agents where one agent is in the core and the other is in the periphery. The star network is a
special case of a core-periphery network. In a star network there exists a partition of agents
such that the core consists of a single agent and all agents in the periphery are connected
to the the core. A nested split graph is a network such that, if a link between agents i and
l exists, and agent k has a higher or equal number of links (degree) than l, then the link
between i and k also exists. That is, neighborhoods are nested. Nested split graphs display
a core-periphery structure.11 Note that the complete and empty network are nested split
graphs and therefore core-periphery networks (take the periphery or core to be the empty
set, respectively).
Deﬁnition 2: A network g¯ is a core − periphery network (split graph) if the set of
agents N can be partitioned into two sets, C(g¯) (the core) and P (g¯) (the periphery), such
that g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ C(g¯) and g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g¯). A star is a core− periphery network in
which the set of agents can be partitioned into two sets, C(g¯) and P (g¯), such that | C(g¯) |= 1
and g¯i,j = 1 ∀i ∈ P (g¯) and ∀j ∈ C(g¯).
Deﬁnition 3: A network g¯ is a nested split graph if and only if
[g¯i,l = 1 ∧ ηk(g¯) ≥ ηl(g¯)]⇒ g¯i,k = 1.
To illustrate the diﬀerence between a core-periphery network and a nested split graph we
provide a simple example in Figure 1 below. The numbers in the graph indicate the degree
of an agent.
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Figure 1
11See König et al (2011) and Mahadev and Peled (1995) for properties of nested split graphs.
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In the following we provide three Lemmas which are useful when establishing Proposition
4 and Corollary 1. In Proposition 4 we prove that in any PNE the network is a nested split
graph. Corollary 1 shows that, if all agents display equal eﬀort levels, then the network is
either empty or complete, while if there exists a pair of agents with diﬀerent eﬀort levels,
then the network displays a core-periphery structure (which is neither the empty nor the
complete network). In Lemma 4 we prove that in any PNE, if an agent i is linked to agent
l, then agent i must also be linked to any agent k with higher or equal eﬀort level than agent
l. This is a direct consequence of the convexity of the value function. Lemma 5 shows that in
any PNE agents with same eﬀort levels must be connected to the same set of agents, while
in Lemma 6 we prove that the neighborhoods of agents with lower eﬀort levels are contained
in the neighborhoods of agents with higher eﬀort levels.
Lemma 4: If g¯∗i,l = 1, then g¯
∗
i,k = 1 for all agents k with x
∗
k ≥ x∗l .
Proof. Assume to the contrary of the above that g¯∗i,l = 1 and g¯
∗
i,k = 0 for some agent
k with x∗k ≥ x∗l . Note ﬁrst that for g¯∗i,l = 1 to be part of a PNE, it must be that agent
i and agent j can not proﬁtably deviate by deleting the link. For agent i this condition
reads v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k. If linking to agent l is proﬁtable for agent
i, then linking to any agent k with x∗k ≥ x∗l is likewise proﬁtable. To see this, note that
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j + x
∗
k) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k, which
follows from the convexity of the value function and x∗k ≥ x∗l . Therefore, for a link between
agents i and k to be absent in PNE, we need that agent k does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link
to agent i. In the following we show that this can not be the case. For g¯∗i,l = 1 to be in place
in a PNE, it must be that agent l can not proﬁtably deviate by deleting his link with agent
i. That is, we must have v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗i ) ≥ k. Note next that, due to
x∗k ≥ x∗l and strict strategic complementarities,
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≥
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j holds. We can
now write v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j+x
∗
i )−v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j)−v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j−xi) ≥ k.
The inequalities again follow from the convexity of the value function and
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≥∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j . We have thereby shown that it is proﬁtable for agent k to link to agent i and
have reached a contradiction. That is, if g¯∗i,l = 1, then agent i ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link
to any agent k with x∗k ≥ x∗l , while any agent k ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to agent i and
therefore g¯∗i,k = 1 for all agents k with x
∗
k ≥ x∗l . Q.E.D.
Lemma 5: In any PNE, x∗i = x
∗
k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. First, Ni(g¯
∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i} ⇒ x∗i = x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then the sum of i
and k's neighbors' eﬀort levels is the same, i.e. y∗i =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j = y
∗
k =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and
therefore x∗i = x
∗
k. Assume next that g¯
∗
i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality, that x
∗
i > x
∗
k.
But then k accesses a higher eﬀort level than i, y∗i =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < y
∗
k =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j ,
and we have reached a contradiction. Second, x∗i = x
∗
k ⇒ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
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Assume to the contrary that x∗i = x
∗
k and Ni(g¯
∗)\{k} 6= Nk(g¯∗)\{i}. Note that for x∗i = x∗k,
eﬀort levels accessed must be equal by strict strategic complementarities, so that y∗i = y
∗
k.
There must therefore exist an agent l, such that l ∈ Nk(g¯∗) and l /∈ Ni(g¯∗). For the link
g¯∗k,l = 1 to be in place in g¯
∗, we must have that v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k.
From y∗i = y
∗
k and the convexity of the value function we then reach a contradiction since
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j +x
∗
l )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)−v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j −x∗l ) ≥ k. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6: In any PNE, x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. First, Ni(g¯
∗)\{k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗)\{i} ⇒ x∗i ≤ x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then k accesses a weakly
higher eﬀort level, i.e. yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≤ yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and therefore x
∗
i ≤ x∗k. Assume
next that g¯∗i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality, that x
∗
i > x
∗
k. But then k accesses a strictly
higher eﬀort level than i, y∗i =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < y
∗
k =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j , and we have reached a
contradiction. Second, x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇒ Ni(g∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g∗) \ {i}. Assume to the contrary
that x∗i ≤ x∗k and there exists an agent l such that l ∈ Ni(g¯∗) and l /∈ Nk(g¯∗). For the link
g¯∗i,l = 1 to be in place in g¯
∗, we must have that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k.
But from y∗i ≤ y∗k and the convexity of the value function it follows that v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j +
xl) − v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k and we have reached a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
We are now in the position to prove Proposition 4, which states that in any PNE the
network is a nested split graph.
Proposition 4: In any PNE the network is a nested split graph.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the complete and the empty network are nested split graphs.
We start by showing that in any PNE, if dk(g¯
∗) ≥ dl(g¯∗), then x∗k ≥ x∗l . Assume to the
contrary that x∗l > x
∗
k. We distinguish two cases. First, dk(g¯
∗) > dl(g¯∗). There then exists
an agent m ∈ Nk(g¯∗) and m /∈ Nl(g¯∗). But, since g¯∗m,k = 1 and x∗l > x∗k, by Lemma
4 g¯∗m,l = 1 and we have reached a contradiction. Assume next that dk(g¯
∗) = dl(g¯∗). If
Nk(g¯
∗)\{l} = Nl(g¯∗)\{k}, then x∗k = x∗l by Lemma 5 and we have reached a contradiction. If
Nk(g¯
∗)\{l} 6= Nl(g¯∗)\{k}, then there exists an agentm ∈ Nk(g¯∗)\{l} andm /∈ Nl(g¯∗)\{k}.
Again by Lemma 4, since g¯∗m,k = 1 and x
∗
l > x
∗
k, it follows that g¯
∗
l,m = 1 and we have reached
a contradiction. We have established that in any PNE, if dk(g¯
∗) ≥ dl(g¯∗) then x∗k ≥ x∗l .
Therefore, in any PNE, if g¯∗i,l = 1 and dk(g¯
∗) ≥ dl(g¯∗), then x∗k ≥ x∗l and by Lemma 4
g¯∗i,k = 1 and g¯
∗ is a nested split graph. Q.E.D.
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We know from the literature in graph theory that nested split graphs are core-periphery
networks (split graphs).12 Below, we provide an alternative proof, which highlights agent's
incentives of linking and exerting eﬀort. Furthermore, a relationship between a property of
the PNE eﬀort levels and PNE network structure is established.
Corollary 1: In any PNE
• if x∗i = x∗j ∀i, j ∈ N, then the network is either empty or complete,
• if x∗i 6= x∗j for some i, j ∈ N, then the network is a core-periphery network (which is
neither complete nor empty).
Proof. Lemma 4 directly implies that if x∗i = x
∗
j ∀i, j ∈ N , then in any PNE the
network is either empty or complete. Next, we focus on the case such that there exists a
pair of agents i and j, with x∗i 6= x∗j .We show that in any PNE the network displays a core-
periphery structure (other than the complete and empty network). Rank agents by their
eﬀort levels in increasing order, such that x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤ ... ≤ x∗n−1 ≤ x∗n. We know from Lemma
1 that the network is not complete, since there exists a pair of agents i and j such that
x∗i 6= x∗j . The network is not empty, as agents have identical payoﬀ functions and singleton
agents display equal eﬀort levels, x¯(0). First, we show that the two lowest ranked agents,
agent 1 and agent 2, are not connected. Assume to the contrary that g¯∗1,2 = 1. From Lemma
4 we know that in this case agent i must be connected to all agents, since x∗j ≥ x∗2 ∀j ≥ 2.
Lemma 6 then implies the network is complete, since Ni(g¯
∗) \ {j} ⊆ Nj(g¯∗) \ {i} holds for
agents j with x∗j ≥ x∗1 ∀j ≥ 1. But then x∗i = x∗j ∀i, j ∈ N by Lemma 1 and we have reached
a contradiction. Since the network is neither empty nor complete, at least one link exists.
Pick the agent i with the lowest subscript who has a link. If i has more than one link, pick
the link to the agent with the lowest subscript j. We discern two cases. First, agent i and j
are adjacent in the ranking. As i is the agent with the lowest subscript to sustain a link, all
agents with lower subscripts have no links. All agents with a subscript higher or equal to i
are connected to each other: By Lemma 4, agent i is connected to all agents with subscripts
higher or equal than j and by Lemma 6, g¯∗l,m = 1 ∀l,m ≥ i. The periphery, P (g¯∗), consists of
agents with subscripts k < i, while the core, C(g¯∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ i.
Second, agent i and j are not adjacent. Note that since g¯∗i,j = 1 and x
∗
i ≤ x∗j−1, we know
by Lemma 6 that the link between j − 1 and j, g¯∗j−1,j = 1, also exists. Next, check for the
link g¯∗j−2,j−1. If g¯
∗
j−2,j−1 = 0, then by Lemma 6 no agent with a subscript lower than j − 2 is
connected to j−1. Furthermore, no pair of agents with subscripts of lower or equal than j−2
is connected. Assume to the contrary that there exists a pair of nodes l,m with l ≤ m < j−2
and g¯∗l,m = 1. By Lemma 4 we must then have that g¯
∗
l,j−1 = 1. This, however, contradicts
12See, for example, Mahadev and Peled (1995).
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Lemma 6, since g¯∗j−2,j−1 = 0. The periphery, P (g¯
∗), consists of agents with subscripts k < j,
while the core, C(g¯∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ j. If g¯∗j−2,j−1 = 1, check for the
link g¯∗j−3,j−2. If g¯
∗
j−3,j−2 = 0, then by above argument the periphery, P (g¯
∗), consists of agents
with subscripts k < j−1, while the core, C(g¯∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ j−1.
If g¯∗j−3,j−2 = 1, proceed in descending order until a pair of adjacent agents is found that is
not connected and deﬁne the core and periphery accordingly. Note that such a pair exists,
since i and j were assumed to be not adjacent and therefore g¯∗i,i+1 = 0. This completes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 provides an existence result for core-periphery networks that are neither
complete nor empty and in which there are no links between agents in the core and the
periphery. More speciﬁcally, assume lim ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
→0
∂2pi(x,y)
∂2y
> 0 and lim ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
→0x¯(0) > 0. Then,
for ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
suﬃciently small, a core-periphery network exists with at least three agents in the
core (for appropriately chosen k). Denote the cardinality of the core with c(g¯∗) =| C(g¯∗) |
and the cardinality of the periphery with p(g¯∗) =| P (g¯∗) |. For ease of notation we write c
and p, respectively.
Proposition 5: If lim ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
→0
∂2pi(x,y)
∂2y
> 0 and lim ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
→0x¯(0) > 0, then for
∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
suﬃciently small, there exists a linking cost k, such that a PNE displays a core−periphery
network with | C(g¯∗) |≥ 3.
Proof. Partition the set of agents into the core, C(g¯∗), with g¯∗i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ C(g¯∗), and
the periphery, P (g¯∗), with g¯∗i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g¯∗). Further assume that g¯∗i,j = 0 ∀i ∈ C(g¯∗)
and ∀j ∈ P (g¯∗). That is, we assume a complete component, consisting of C(g¯∗), and a set
of singletons, P (g¯∗). Denote the PNE eﬀort level of an agent in the core of size c with
x∗c . The condition for an agent in the core to not delete all his links (recall the argument
from Proposition 3) is given by v((c−1)x
∗
c)−v(0)
c−1 ≥ k. Denote with x′c the eﬀort level in a
deviation where a pair of agents p ∈ P (g¯∗) and c ∈ C(g¯∗) creates a link. The condition
for an agent in the periphery to not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to an agent in the core is
given by k ≥ v(x′c) − v(0). (These are the only two conditions one needs to consider, since
payoﬀs for an agent in the periphery linking to another agent in periphery are lower). For
∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
suﬃciently small, eﬀort levels of all agents are arbitrarily close to x¯(0) > 0 and
lim ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
→0
∂2v(y)
∂2y
= lim ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
→0
∂2pi(x,y)
∂2y
> 0. That is, lim ∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
→0
∂2v(y)
∂2y
is bounded away from
zero. Note also that the value function v and best response function x¯(0) are continuous. For
∂pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
suﬃciently small we have v((c−1)x
∗
c)−v(0)
c−1 > v(x
′
c) − v(0), where the inequality follows
from ∂
2v(y)
∂2y
> 0, c ≥ 3 and all eﬀort levels being arbitrarily close to x¯(0) > 0. We can
therefore ﬁnd a value of k such that v((c−1)x
∗
c)−v(0)
c−1 > k > v(x
′
c)− v(0). Q.E.D.
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In the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation of Calvó-Armengol et al (2005 and 2009) ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
= 0
and Proposition 5 does not apply. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the type of core-
periphery networks described in Proposition 5 can be derived easily, but we omit them here.
Instead, Proposition 6 provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a PNE star network.
The appeal of this proposition is to show the existence of a PNE core-periphery network such
that all agents in the periphery are connected to the core. Recall that the payoﬀ function
in Calvó-Armengol et al (2005 and 2009) is given by pi(xi, yi) = xi − β2x2i + λxi
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj,
where λ
β
< 1
n−1 .
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Note ﬁrst that a necessary condition for a PNE to exist is that eﬀort levels are a NE
on the corresponding ﬁxed network. Ballester et al (2006) show that a Nash equilibrium
on a ﬁxed network exists if and only if β > λµ1(g¯), where µ1(g¯) is the largest eigenvector
of the corresponding adjacency matrix. For a star network the relevant condition reads
β > λ
√
n− 1, which is stated below as n < 1 + λ2
β2
. The ﬁrst condition of Proposition 6,
β > λ(2 +
√
2), imposes an upper bound on λ relative to β, which is independent of k and
n. That is, if the parameter governing strategic complementarities, λ, is suﬃciently large
relative to the convexity of the cost function, β, then a PNE star network does not exist
(for any combination of k and n). Note next that for a PNE star network to exist, linking
cost k must be in an intermediate range. The lower bound on linking cost k is given by the
marginal payoﬀs of two agents in the periphery linking to each other. The upper bound,
in turn, is given by the average marginal payoﬀs of the center of the star linking to the
remaining n − 1 agents. Both bounds are increasing in n. For β > λ√n− 1 the marginal
payoﬀ of a peripheral agent linking to the center is always higher than the center's average
marginal payoﬀ from his n− 1 links to agents in the periphery. Therefore, the requirement
that an agent in the periphery does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to delete his link to the center is
satisﬁed if k is below the aforementioned upper bound. The lower bound on n (together
with β > λ(2 +
√
2)) then ensures that the upper bound on linking cost is, in fact, (weakly)
larger than the lower bound. The last condition presents the knife-edge case where the lower
bound on linking cost k coincides with the upper bound.
Proposition 6: If best response functions are linear, then there exists a PNE with a
star network if and only if
β > λ(2 +
√
2) and
• β(2β−λ)λ(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 ≤ k ≤ λ(2β
3+(n+1)β2λ−(n−1)λ3)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 and
13We brieﬂy show that pi(xi, yi) = xi− β2x2i +λxi
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj fulﬁlls the conditions on our payoﬀ functions
for λβ <
1
n−1 . Note that
∂pi(x,y)
∂y = λx > 0 and
∂2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y = λ > 0. The best response function is given by
x¯(y) = 1+λyβ with
∂x¯(y)
∂y =
λ
β > 0. The value function is given by v(y) =
(1+λy)2
2β and
∂2v(y)
∂2y =
λ2
β > 0.
Furthermore, ∂pi(x,y)∂y = λx > 0 (note that x¯(0) =
1
β ) and
∂2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y = λ > 0. For existence we require that
λ
β <
1
n−1 , so that
∂x¯(y)
∂y =
λ
β <
1
n−1 .
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1 + β
2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 < n < 1 +
β2
λ2
, or
• k = β(2β−λ)λ(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 and n = 1 +
β2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 holds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Proposition 7 we show that in any PNE such that two agents have diﬀerent eﬀort
levels, there exists a core-periphery partition such that agents in the core exert strictly higher
eﬀort levels and obtain strictly higher gross payoﬀs. The reason for expressing the statement
in terms of the existence of such a partition can be illustrated with a star network. In a star
network there are two ways to deﬁne a core-periphery network. First, the center of the star
as the core and the remaining spokes as the periphery. Second, the center of the star and one
spoke as the core and the remaining spokes as the periphery. Note that the center of a star
exerts strictly higher eﬀort levels than the remaining spokes (this follows from Proposition
7). In the ﬁrst case agents in core exert strictly higher eﬀort levels, while in the second case
there exists an agent in the core, such that his eﬀort level is equal to those of the periphery.
Proposition 7: In any PNE with a pair of agents i and j, such that x∗i 6= x∗j , there
exists a core-periphery partition of agents, such that x∗i > x
∗
j and pi
∗
i > pi
∗
j ∀i ∈ C(g¯∗) and
∀j ∈ P (g¯∗).
Proof. We start by proving the ﬁrst part of the statement. Rank again agents by their
eﬀort levels in increasing order, such that x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤ ... ≤ x∗n−1 ≤ x∗n. From Proposition 4
we know that there exists an agent x∗k such that g¯
∗
i−1,i = 0 ∀i ≤ k and g¯∗i,i+1 = 1 ∀i ≥ k. We
discern two cases. First, x∗k = x
∗
k+1. Deﬁne C(g¯
∗) = {i : xi ≥ xk} and P (g¯∗) = {i : xi < xk}
and assume, contrary to the above, that x∗k−1 ≥ x∗k = x∗k+1. From Lemma 6 we know that
Nk+1(g¯
∗)\{k−1} ⊆ Nk−1(g¯∗)\{k} must hold. That is, if x∗k−1 ≥ x∗k+1, then all of agent k+1's
neighbors are also k− 1's neighbors. But then, since k+ 1 is connected with k, k− 1 is also
connected with k and g¯∗k−1,k = 1. We have reached a contradiction. Next, x
∗
k < x
∗
k+1. In this
case simply deﬁne C(g¯∗) = {i : xi ≥ xk+1} and P (g¯∗) = {i : xi < xk+1}. For the second part
of the statement note that from x∗i > x
∗
j we know that y
∗
i =
∑
k∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
k >
∑
k∈Nj(g¯∗) x
∗
k = y
∗
j
holds. We can then write pi∗i (x
∗
i , y
∗
i ) > pii(x
∗
j , y
∗
i ) > pi
∗
j (x
∗
j , y
∗
j ), where the inequalities follow
from y∗i > y
∗
j , positive externalities and a unique maximizer. Q.E.D.
Proposition 7 shows that more central agents obtain higher gross payoﬀs. In the following
we provide an example which illustrates that the central agent may, however, obtain strictly
lower net payoﬀs. In this case the cost of sustaining a higher number of links outweighs
higher gross payoﬀs.
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Example 1: Assume n = 10, β = 2
3
and λ = 1
10
.
From plugging in the parameter values into the conditions in Proposition 6 we know
that the star network is a PNE for 725
11907
≤ k ≤ 16
243
. Payoﬀs are β(β+λ(n−1))
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − (n − 1)k
for the center and β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − k for an agent in the periphery. It can easily be checked
that payoﬀs for an agent in the center are strictly higher than for an agent in the core for
725
11907
≤ k < 125
1944
, while they are strictly higher for an agent in the periphery if 125
1944
< k ≤ 16
243
.
Next we turn to social welfare. Denote the vector of eﬃcient eﬀort levels for a given
network g¯ with x∗(g¯) and agent i's entry in vector x∗(g¯) with xi∗(g¯). That is, x∗(g¯) yields
the weakly highest sum of payoﬀs for a given network g¯, so that W (x∗(g¯), g¯) ≥ W (x(g¯), g¯)
∀x ∈ X1×X2× ...×Xn. We show in Proposition 8 that, if payoﬀs are bounded above in the
complete network and ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0, then there exists a linking cost k∗, such that for linking
cost above k∗, the eﬃcient conﬁguration is given by the empty network and each agent
exerting eﬀort level x¯(0). For linking cost below k∗, the eﬃcient conﬁguration is given by
the complete network and each agent exerting the same eﬀort level xi∗(g¯c) = x∗(g¯c) > x¯(0)
∀i ∈ N.
Note that if payoﬀs are bounded in the complete network, then they are bounded in any
other network. A suﬃcient condition for bounded payoﬀs is therefore that pi(x, (n − 1)x)
is concave in x and that there exists a stationary point. The linear-quadratic speciﬁcation
satisﬁes ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0 and one can easily show that in this case k∗ = 2n(1 − (β2 − λ)(n − 1)),
while the condition that eﬃcient payoﬀs are bounded in the complete network is given by
λ
β
< 1
2(n−1) .
Since the link formation process is not relevant for eﬃciency, Proposition 8 and Corollary
2 also hold in the one-sided case. Note, however, that the cost of a link in the one-sided
case is k, while in the two-sided speciﬁcation it is 2k and the respective bounds have to be
adjusted accordingly.
Proposition 8: If ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0 and payoﬀs are bounded above in the complete network,
then there exists a k∗, such that for linking cost k ≤ k∗ the eﬃcient conﬁguration is given
by the complete network and all agents exerting same eﬀort level x∗(g¯c) > x¯(0). For k ≥ k∗
the eﬃcient conﬁguration is given by the empty network and all agents exerting eﬀort level
x¯(0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 states that for k ∈ (0, k∗) all PNE are ineﬃcient. Note that if k ∈ (0, k2],
then there exists a PNE network that is complete and therefore coincides with the eﬃcient
network. However, due to positive externalities, PNE eﬀort levels are lower than in the
eﬃcient conﬁguration and any PNE is therefore ineﬃcient. For k ∈ (k2, k∗) the unique
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PNE is the empty network, while the unique eﬃcient network is complete. For k ≥ k∗ the
unique PNE is eﬃcient and consists of the empty network and each agent exerting eﬀort
level x¯(0). It is also clear that k2 < k∗ and we omit the proof. Note that the range of linking
cost for which any PNE is ineﬃcient may be thought of as large, since for a PNE to be
eﬃcient, the network must be empty.
Corollary 2: If k ∈ (0, k∗), then all PNE conﬁgurations are ineﬃcient. If k ∈ (k2, k∗),
then all PNE networks are diﬀerent from the eﬃcient network, while if k ≥ k∗, then the
unique PNE conﬁguration is eﬃcient.
Proof. Omitted.
Remark. We brieﬂy comment on implications of the convexity of the value function.
More speciﬁcally, under one-sided link formation, the argument for our equilibrium charac-
terization also goes through with strategic substitutes. To see this, note that when links are
one-sided, then only the agent extending a link in a deviation may adjust his eﬀort level.
Therefore, Proposition 11 and Corollary 3 also hold for payoﬀ functions such that eﬀort
levels are strategic substitutes, as long as the value function is convex (and link formation is
one-sided). Under two-sided link formation both agents may adjust their eﬀort level when
creating a new link and whether Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 carry over is not that clear.
However, it appears plausible that, if the payoﬀ function is such that the value function
is suﬃciently convex and agents decrease their eﬀort suﬃciently little when creating a new
link, then the arguments of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 go through for this case as well.
3 Conclusion
This paper provides a model of endogenous network formation with peer eﬀects, where peer
eﬀects are assumed to induce positive local externalities and strategic complementarities
in eﬀort levels. These features are descriptive of a wide range of social and economic and
phenomena, such as educational attainment, crime, labor market participation and R&D
expenditures of ﬁrms. We solve the model for a two-sided speciﬁcation, where both agents
need to agree to form a link, and a one-sided speciﬁcation, where links are created unilaterally.
In both cases the only (pairwise) Nash equilibrium network structures are nested split graphs,
which are a special case of core-periphery networks, often observed in empirical work. Gross
payoﬀs and eﬀort levels are shown to be higher for central agents. Agents in the periphery
may, however, obtain strictly higher payoﬀs net of linking cost. This may be informative for
empirical studies, which frequently report higher payoﬀs and eﬀort levels for more central
agents, while typically disregarding linking cost. We show, under additional assumptions on
payoﬀs, that the only eﬃcient networks are the complete and the empty network. Moreover,
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there exists a range of linking cost for which any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
For a strict subset of this range not only is any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium ineﬃcient, but
also any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium network structure is diﬀerent from the eﬃcient network.
Finally, we emphasize the relevance of the convexity of the value function in obtaining core-
periphery networks and, more speciﬁcally, nested split graphs. While for payoﬀ functions
such that the value function is convex, all (pairwise) Nash equilibria are nested split graphs,
many more equilibrium structures may arise in the case of concave value functions (Baetz,
2012). Furthermore, we indicate that, as long as the value function is convex and link
formation is one-sided, all Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs, irrespective of
whether we consider strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
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4 APPENDIX A - The Two-Sided Model
Proposition 1: For any ﬁxed network, g¯, there exists a unique NE in eﬀort levels.
Proof. We discern two cases. First, linear best response functions, which allow us to use
the existence result provided by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006). Write the best
response function as x¯i(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj) =
λ
β
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj+
1
β
(where β governs own concavity and
λ the strength of local interaction). A NE exists and is unique if and only if β > λµ1(g¯),
where µ1(g¯) is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of g¯. One can show that the
largest eigenvector for a graph lies between the following bounds max{davg(g¯),
√
dmax(g¯)} ≤
µ1(g¯) ≤ dmax(g¯),14 where dmax(g¯) is the maximum degree and davg(g¯) the average degree
in network g¯. Note that then the largest eigenvector for a graph with n agents is at most
n − 1 (and maximal and equal to n − 1 in the complete network, g¯c). For the existence
of a unique NE we therefore only need λ
β
< 1
n−1 to hold, where
λ
β
is the slope of the best
response function. Second, strictly concave best response functions. Deﬁne the function
fg¯ : X
n → Xn as
fg¯(x) =

x¯(
∑
j∈N1(g¯)
xj)
...
x¯(
∑
j∈Nn(g¯)
xj)
.
From strategic complementarities we know that x¯(y) is strictly increasing and, together
with strict concavity of x¯(y), f is increasing and strictly concave. We can now apply Kennan's
result (Theorem 3.3 in Kennan (2001)), which is restated here. Suppose f is an increasing
and strictly concave function from Rn to Rn, such that f(0) ≥ 0, f(a) > a for some positive
vector a, and f(b) < b for some vector b > a. Then f has a unique positive ﬁxed point.
Recall that we assumed x¯(0) > 0 and therefore f(0) > 0. To see that there exists a vector
a such that f(a) > a, choose a = (ε1, ..., εn) such that εi = ε <
x¯(0)
n−1 ∀i ∈ N and ε > 0.
The sum of neighbor's eﬀort levels of an agent with ηi(g¯) neighbors is given by ηi(g¯)ε. Note
that we then have x¯(ηi(g¯)ε) > x¯(0) > ηi(g¯)ε. The ﬁrst inequality holds because x¯ is strictly
increasing, while the second inequality follows from x¯(0) > ε(n− 1) and n− 1 ≥ ηi(g¯). Next
we show that there exists a vector b with f(b) < b. Choose again a vector such that all
entries are equal, i.e., b =(b1, ..., bn) with b = bi ∀i ∈ N . The condition f(b) < b can be
written as x¯(ηi(g¯)b) < b ∀i ∈ N . For b suﬃciently large, x¯(ηi(g¯)b) < b ∀i ∈ N holds due to
the assumption that ∂x¯(y)
∂y
< 1
n−1 for some value of y, the strict concavity of x¯(y) and n ≥ 3.
To show that b > a, note that we can choose ε (and therefore a) arbitrarily close to zero
for x¯(ηi(g¯)ε) > x¯(0) > ηi(g¯)ε to hold. Q.E.D.
14See, for example, L. Lovasz, Geometric Representations of Graphs (2009).
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Proposition 2: If k < k1, then the unique PNE is the complete network. If k ≥ k1,
then there exists a PNE such that the network is empty.
Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that there exists a unique equilibrium on a ﬁxed
network, where the only link is the one between agents i and j. Since i and j form a complete
component, x∗ = x∗i = x
∗
j (from Lemma 1) and the corresponding gross payoﬀs are given
by v(x∗j(g¯
e + g¯i,j)) = pi
∗
i (x
∗
i , x
∗
j). If k <vi(x
∗
j(g¯
e + g¯i,j)) − vi(0) = k1, then a pair of agents
i and j ﬁnds it proﬁtable to create the link g¯∗i,j and create eﬀort level x
∗. Note that this is
the least proﬁtable link in any network, due to the convexity of the value function v and
strict strategic complementarities in eﬀort levels. Therefore, every pair of agents must be
connected for any k < k1 and the unique PNE is the complete network. If, on the other
hand, k ≥vi(x∗j(g¯e + g¯i,j))− vi(0) = k1, then no pair of agents can proﬁtably deviate in the
empty network. Therefore, for k ≥ k1 a PNE exists such that the network is empty. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3: If k > k2, then the unique PNE is the empty network. If k ≤ k2, then
there exists a PNE such that the network is complete.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the relevant deviation to consider in a complete network is an agent
deleting all his links. To see this, note that due to the convexity of v, v(hxc∗)−v((h−1)xc∗) <
v((n − 1)xc∗) − v((n − 2)xc∗) for all 0 < h < n − 1. That is, marginal payoﬀs are strictly
increasing in the number of links and an agent wants to delete all his links, if any. For
linking cost k ≤ k2 = v((n−1)xc∗)−v(0)
n−1 there therefore exists a complete PNE network, while
for k > k2 there does not, as an agent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to delete all his links (and to decrease
his eﬀort level). Next we show that for k = k2, the only PNE networks are the complete
and the empty network. Assume to the contrary that there exists a PNE with a network
that is neither empty nor complete. Consider the most proﬁtable deviation of an agent i
in network g¯∗ 6= g¯c, consisting of deleting h of his ηi(g¯∗) links. Note that for any agent i,
n− 1 ≥ ηi(g¯∗) ≥ h holds. Denote the network after proposed deviation with g¯′ and the set
of agents whose links are deleted in the deviation of agent i with H = {j : g¯∗i,j = 1∧ g¯′i,j = 0}.
We can then compare average payoﬀs per link in the complete network g¯c∗ with payoﬀs in
g¯∗ 6= g¯c and write
v((n−1)xc∗)−v(0)
n−1 ≥ v(ηi(g¯
∗)xc∗)−v(ηi(g¯∗)xc∗−hxc∗)
ηi(g¯∗)−h >
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j−
∑
j∈H x
∗
j )
ηi(g¯∗)−h .
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the convexity of v, n−1 ≥ ηi(g¯∗) and h ≥ 0. The second
inequality follows from the convexity of v and ηi(g¯
∗)xc∗ − hxc∗ > ∑j∈Ni(g¯∗) x∗j −∑j∈H x∗j
and hxc∗ >
∑
j∈H x
∗
j (for the last two inequalities, recall that eﬀort levels are maximal in
the complete network). The threshold k2 was deﬁned as k2 = v((n−1)x
c∗)−v(0)
n−1 and the only
PNE networks are therefore either the complete network and (from Proposition 2) the empty
network. For linking cost k > k2, agents ﬁnd it proﬁtable to delete their links and the unique
PNE is the empty network. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 3: k1 < k2.
Proof. k2 − k1 = v((n − 1)x∗(g¯c)) − vi(x∗j(g¯e + g¯i,j)). From Lemma 2 we know that
x∗(g¯c) > x∗j(g
e + g¯i,j) and since v is strictly increasing, k
2 − k1 > 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6: If best response functions are linear, then there exists a PNE with a
star network if and only if β > λ(2 +
√
2) and either
• β(2β−λ)λ(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 ≤ k ≤ λ(2β
3+(n+1)β2λ−(n−1)λ3)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 and
1 + β
2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 < n < 1 +
β2
λ2
, or
• k = β(2β−λ)λ(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 and n = 1 +
β2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 holds.
Proof. A necessary condition for a PNE star network is that eﬀort levels are a NE
on a ﬁxed star network. From Ballester (2006) we know that a NE on a star network
with n agents exists if and only if β > λ
√
n− 1, which we write as n < 1 + β2
λ2
below.
Note next that in a star network, all agents in the periphery access the same eﬀort level,
x∗c , and therefore all agents in the periphery display the same eﬀort level, x
∗
p. The agent in
the center, c, therefore maximizes xc ∈ argmaxxc∈Xxc − β2x2c + λxc(n − 1)xp, while for an
agent in the periphery we have xp ∈argmaxxp∈Xxp − β2x2p + λxpxc. The reaction functions
are given by xc(xp) =
1+λxp(n−1)
β
and xp(xc) =
1+λxc
β
. Equilibrium eﬀort levels are given by
x∗c=
β+λ(n−1)
β2−λ2(n−1) and x
∗
p =
β+λ
β2−λ2(n−1) . Plugging equilibrium eﬀort levels back into the payoﬀ
function yields equilibrium gross payoﬀs of pi∗c =
β(β+λ(n−1))2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 and pi
∗
p =
β(β+λ)2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 . Next,
we calculate deviation payoﬀs of when two agents in the periphery create a link. Denote with
x1
′
p and x
2′
p the eﬀort levels of the two agents involved in the new link. A deviating agent
maximizes x1
′
p ∈argmaxx1′p ∈Xx1
′
p − β2 (x1
′
p ) +λx
1′
p (xc +x
2′
p ), which yields the following reaction
function x1
′
p (x
∗
c , x
2′
p ) =
1+λ(x∗c+x2
′
p )
β
. Due to symmetry, deviation eﬀort levels are given by
x1
′
p (x
∗
c , x
2′
p ) = x
2′
p (x
∗
c , x
1′
p ) = x
′
p =
β2+λβ
(β−λ)(β2−λ2(n−1)) and corresponding deviation gross payoﬀs
by pi′p =
β3(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 . For the existence of a star network we now need three conditions
to hold simultaneously. First, linking cost k must be such that an agent in the periphery
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to the center of the star. Second, given the link with the center, an
agent in the periphery does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to another agent in the periphery.
We can write this as β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β ≥ k and k ≥ β
3(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 =
β(2β−λ)λ(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 , respectively. Note that
1
2β
are the payoﬀs of a singleton. Third, linking
cost k must be such that the center of the star ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to the periphery.
We can write this as ( β(β+λ(n−1))
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β )/(n − 1) = λ(2β
3+(n+1)β2λ−(n−1)λ3)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 ≥ k. First we
show that for β >
√
n− 1λ the marginal payoﬀs of an agent in the periphery linking to the
center always larger than average marginal payoﬀs of the center when linking to the n − 1
agents in the periphery. Subtracting the latter from the former one obtains (n−1)λ
2
2(β3−(n−1)βλ2) .
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The nominator is positive and we can focus on the denominator 2β(β2 − (n− 1)λ2), which
is positive for β >
√
n− 1λ. Combining the two remaining inequalities one can show after
some algebraic manipulation that they simultaneously hold if and only if β > (2 +
√
2)λ and
either β(2β−λ)λ(β+λ)
2
2(β−λ)2(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 ≤ k ≤ λ(2β
3+(n+1)β2λ−(n−1)λ3)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 and 1 +
β2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 < n < 1 +
β2
λ2
or
k = β(2β−λ)λ(β+λ)
2
2(β−λ)2(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 and n = 1 +
β2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 holds.
15 Q.E.D.
Proposition 8: If ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0 and payoﬀs are bounded above in the complete network,
then there exists a k∗, such that for linking cost k ≤ k∗ the eﬃcient conﬁguration is given
by the complete network and all agents exerting same eﬀort level x∗(g¯c) > x¯(0). For k ≥ k∗
the eﬃcient conﬁguration is given by the empty network and all agents exerting eﬀort level
x¯(0).
Proof. We show the above result in three steps.
Step 1: A network that is not empty or complete is not eﬃcient for any linking cost k.
Assume to the contrary that the eﬃcient network g¯∗ /∈ {g¯e, g¯c}. We discern two cases.
Case 1: The eﬃcient vector of eﬀort levels, x∗(g¯∗), is such that all agents exert the same
eﬀort level, x∗ = xi∗(g¯∗) ∀i ∈ N.
Note that forW (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) to be maximal it must be thatW (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) ≥ W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗−
g¯i,j) for any existing link in g¯∗. Otherwise, deleting a link increases total payoﬀs and
W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗− g¯i,j) > W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗), contradicting our assumption that g¯∗ is eﬃcient. That
is, the marginal gross beneﬁt of a link in g¯∗ is weakly larger than the cost of linking, even when
eﬀort levels (suboptimally) remain the same after deleting the link. But then for any pair of
agents l andm such that g¯∗l,m = 0, we have thatW (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗+ g¯l,m) ≥ W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗), which
follows directly from ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0 and all agents exerting equal eﬀort. Due to ∂2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0,
x∗(g¯∗) does not satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗ + g¯l,m) and there exists a
vector of eﬀort levels x′ such that W (x′, g¯∗ + g¯l,m) > W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗).
Case 2: The eﬃcient vector of eﬀort levels, x∗(g¯∗), is such that there exists a pair of
agents i and j with xi∗(g¯∗) 6= xj∗(g¯∗).
Denote with i an agent with the weakly highest eﬀort level and with j an agent such
that xj∗(g¯∗) < xi∗(g¯∗). We start by showing that Nj(g¯∗) ⊂ Ni(g¯∗). First note that for g¯∗
to be eﬃcient, there can be no agent l such that l ∈ Nj(g¯∗) and l /∈ Ni(g¯∗). Otherwise, due
to ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0, switching the link of l with j to a link from l to i strictly increases payoﬀs.
A conﬁguration in which Nj(g¯∗) = Ni(g¯∗) and xj∗ < xi∗ is also not eﬃcient, which follows
directly from W 's ﬁrst order conditions for xj and xi. Therefore, Nj(g¯∗) ⊂ Ni(g¯∗) holds for
xj∗(g¯∗) < xi∗(g¯∗). In the following we discern two subcases.
Case 2, Subcase 1: Agent i and j are not connected, g¯∗i,j = 0.
We start by showing that for any conﬁguration with g¯∗ /∈ {g¯e, g¯c} and xj∗(g¯∗) < xi∗(g¯∗),
there exists an alternative conﬁguration, denoted with x′ and g¯′, which yields weakly larger
15The calculations were executed with Mathematica and the codes are available upon request.
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payoﬀs than W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗). Deﬁne x′ as x′ = (x1∗, ..., xj−1∗, xi∗, xj+1∗, ..., xn∗) and g¯′ as
g¯′ = g¯∗ +
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗) g¯jl. That is, x
′ and g′ is a conﬁguration where, relative to x∗ and
g¯∗, the eﬀort level of j is increased to i's eﬀort level in x∗ and j is linked in g¯′ to all
agents to whom i is linked to in g¯∗. Note ﬁrst that for W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) to be eﬃcient, it
must be that W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) ≥ W (x′′, g¯′′), where x′′ = (x1∗, ..., xi−1∗, xj∗, xi+1∗, ..., xn∗) and
g¯′′ = g¯∗ −
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) g¯il. That is, payoﬀs W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) must be at least as large as in
a conﬁguration where, relative to x∗ and g¯∗, agent i's eﬀort level in x′′ is decreased to j′s
eﬀort level in g¯∗ and i is linked to agents in g¯′′, to which j sustains links in g¯∗. The diﬀerence
in total payoﬀs of conﬁguration x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗ and x′′, g¯′′ is given by
W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗)−W (x′′, g¯′′) =
pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) xl∗ +
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗) xl∗)− pii(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗) xl∗)
+
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗)
xk∗)−
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗) xk∗ − xi∗)
− | Ni(g¯∗) \Nj(g¯∗) | k ≥ 0.
The diﬀerence of the ﬁrst and second term yields the gross marginal eﬀect on i's payoﬀs
from increasing the eﬀort level from xj∗ to xi∗ and accessing eﬀort levels of agents l ∈
Ni(g¯∗) \ Nj(g¯∗). The diﬀerence of the third and fourth term yields the eﬀect on payoﬀs of
agents l ∈ Ni(g¯∗) \Nj(g¯∗) accessing i′s eﬀort level xi∗ in g¯∗, while the last term are the cost
of additional links in g¯∗ as compared to g¯′′. The inequality just follows from the assumption
that the conﬁguration x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗ is eﬃcient. We can now write an analogous expression for
W (x′, g¯′)−W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗), which is given by
W (x′, g¯′)−W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) =
= pij(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) xl∗ +
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗) xl∗)− pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗) xl∗)
+
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗) xk∗ + xi∗)−
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗) xk∗)
− | Ni(g¯∗) \Nj(g¯∗) | .
Note that the ﬁrst diﬀerence (between the ﬁrst and second term) inW (x′, g¯′)−W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗)
is the same as in W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗)−W (x′′, g¯′′). Likewise, cost of linking are the same, so that
we can focus on the diﬀerences of the third and fourth terms, which stem from the eﬀect on
agents l ∈ Ni(g¯∗) \ Nj(g¯∗). From ∂2pi(x,y)∂2y ≥ 0 we know that the diﬀerence of the third and
fourth term is weakly larger in W (x′, g¯′)−W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) than in W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗)−W (x′′, g¯′′)
and therefore W (x′, g¯′) −W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) ≥ W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) −W (x′′, g¯′′). Note that x′, g¯′ is
suboptimal since ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0 and the ﬁrst order conditions for agents l ∈ Ni(g¯∗) \ Nj(g¯∗)
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are not satisﬁed in x′, g¯′. That is, there exists a vector of eﬀort levels x∗(g¯′) such that
W (x∗(g¯′), g¯′) > W (x′, g¯′) ≥ W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗). We have reached a contradiction.
Case 2, Subcase 2: Agent i and j are connected, g¯∗i,j = 1.
By a similar argument as above, we show that a proﬁle of eﬀort levels x′ and a net-
work g¯′ yields strictly larger payoﬀs than W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗), so that W (x′, g¯′) > W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗),
where x′ = (x1∗, ..., xj−1∗, xi∗, xj+1∗, ..., xn∗) and g¯′ = g¯∗ +
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗) g¯jl. That is, a conﬁg-
uration x′ and g¯′, where (relative to x∗ and g¯∗) the eﬀort level of j is increased to i's
eﬀort level in x∗ and j is linked in g¯′ to all agents to whom i is linked to in g¯∗. Note
that for W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) to be eﬃcient, it must be that W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) ≥ W (x′′, g¯′′), where
x′′ = (x1∗, ..., xi−1∗, xj∗, xi+1∗, ..., xn∗) and g¯′′ = g¯∗ −
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) g¯il. That is, payoﬀs
W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) must be at least as large as in a conﬁguration where, relative to x∗ and g¯∗,
agent i's eﬀort level in x′′ is decreased to j's eﬀort level in g¯∗ and i links to agents in g¯′′, to
which j sustains links in g¯∗. Since W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) is assumed to be eﬃcient, it must be that
W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗)−W (x′′, g¯′′) ≥ 0. We can write for W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗)−W (x′′, g¯′′)
W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗)−W (x′′, g¯′′) =
= pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) xl∗ +
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xj∗)− pii(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xj∗)
+
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗) xk∗)−
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗) xk∗ − xi∗)
− | Ni(g¯∗) \Nj(g¯∗) | k ≥ 0.
While for W (x′, g¯′)−W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) we have
W (x′, g¯′)−W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) =
= pij(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) xl∗ +
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗)− pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗)
+
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗) xk∗ + xi∗)−
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\Nj(g¯∗) pil(xl∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗) xk∗)
− | Ni(g¯∗) \Nj(g¯∗) | .
Again the linking cost is the same in both expressions and the diﬀerence between the
third and fourth term is, due to ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0, weakly larger in W (x′, g¯′)−W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) than
in W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) −W (x′′, g¯′′). However, the ﬁrst diﬀerence is strictly larger in W (x′, g¯′) −
W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) than in W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) −W (x′′, g¯′′). This follows from xi∗(g¯∗) > xj∗(g¯∗) and
strict strategic complementarities (strictly increasing diﬀerences of pi). Therefore,W (x′, g¯′) >
W (x∗(g¯∗), g¯∗) and the eﬃcient network is either complete or empty.
Step 2: Eﬃcient eﬀort levels in the complete network are equal.
Assume to the contrary that there exist a pair of agents such that xi∗(g¯c) 6= xj∗(g¯c) and
assume without loss of generality that xi∗(g¯c) > xj∗(g¯c). For W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) to be
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eﬃcient we need that W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) −W (xj∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) ≥ 0. In the following
we show that
W (xi∗, xi∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)−W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) >
W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)−W (xj∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) ≥ 0
and therefore W (xi∗, xi∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) > W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c). Again we write out the
respective expressions. First,
W (xi∗, xi∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)−W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) =
= pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xi∗)− pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xj∗)
+pij(xi∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗)− pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗)
+
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xi∗ + xi∗)
−∑l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,∑k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xi∗ + xj∗)
Second,
W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)−W (xj∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) =
= pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗)− pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xj∗)
+pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xj∗)− pii(xj∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xj∗)
+
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xi∗ + xj∗)
−∑l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,∑k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xj∗ + xj∗)
To evaluate
W (xi∗, xi∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)−W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) >
W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)−W (xj∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)
we again compare across pairs of terms of the expressions. Comparing the respective ﬁrst
and second terms we have
pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xi∗)− pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xj∗) >
pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗)− pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xj∗).
The inequality follows from ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0. For the third and fourth term we can write
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pij(xi∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗)− pij(xj∗,
∑
l∈Nj(g¯∗)\{i} xl∗ + xi∗) >
pii(xi∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xj∗)− pii(xj∗,
∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{j} xl∗ + xj∗),
again this follows from ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0. For the diﬀerence of the ﬁfth and sixth term we have∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xi∗ + xi∗)
−∑l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,∑k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xi∗ + xj∗) ≥∑
l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,
∑
k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xi∗ + xj∗)
−∑l∈Ni(g¯∗)\{i,j} pil(xl∗,xj∗,∑k∈Nl(g¯∗)\{i,j} xk∗ + xj∗ + xj∗),
which follows form ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2y
≥ 0. Therefore,W (xi∗, xi∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c) > W (xi∗, xj∗,x−i,−j∗, g¯c)
and we have reached a contradiction. That is, in the complete network eﬀort levels must be
such that x∗(g¯c) = xi∗ ∀i ∈ N.
Step 3: There exists a linking cost k∗, such that for k ≤ k∗ the eﬃcient network is
complete, while for k ≥ k∗ the eﬃcient network is empty.
Note ﬁrst that for any vector of eﬀort levels x, total gross payoﬀs are larger in the
complete network than in any other network, while the diﬀerence in linking cost is bounded
by kn(n−1). That is, if payoﬀs are bounded in the complete network, then they are bounded
for any other network. From the ﬁrst order conditions and ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0 we know that
x∗(g¯c) > x¯(0). Since payoﬀs are bounded and total linking cost is linearly increasing in k for
any network that is not empty, there exists a linking cost k∗, such that for linking cost k
smaller or equal than k∗, the eﬃcient network is complete, while for linking cost k larger or
equal than k∗, the eﬃcient network is empty (with agents exerting eﬀort level x¯(0)). Q.E.D.
5 APPENDIX B - The One-Sided Model
5.1 Model Description
The one-sided speciﬁcation diﬀers from the two-sided model in that only one agent needs to
extend a link (and bear the cost), in order for a pair of agents to beneﬁt from each other's
eﬀort level. This allows us to use Nash equilibrium as equilibrium concept. Note that under
pairwise Nash equilibrium, pairs of agents can create only one link at a time and both agents
may adjust their eﬀort levels. Under Nash equilibrium, we consider deviations where an
agent may extend multiple links (and simultaneously delete any subset of existing ones),
but only the (single) deviating agent may adjust eﬀort levels.
Let again N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players, with n ≥ 3 . As before, each player i
chooses a personal eﬀort level xi ∈ X and a set of links, which are represented as a row vector
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gi = (gi,1,..., gii−1, gii+1,..., gin), where gij ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ N\{i}. Assume X = [0,+∞)
and gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1}n−1. The set of strategies of i is denoted by Si = X × Gi and the
set of strategies of all players by S = S1 × S2 × ... × Sn. A strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) ∈ S
again speciﬁes the individual eﬀort level of each player, x = (x1,x2,..., xn), and a set of links
g = (g1,g2, ...,gn). Agent i is said to sustain or extend a link to j, if gi,j = 1 and to receive a
link from j, if gj,i = 1. The network of relations g is a directed graph, i.e., it is possible that
gi,j 6= gj,i. Let Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : gi,j = 1} be the set of agents i has extended a link to and
deﬁne ηi(g) = |Ni(g)|. Call the closure of g an undirected network, denoted by g¯ =cl(g),
where g¯i,j = max{gi,j, gj,i} for each i and j in N. Denote with Ni(g¯) ={j ∈ N : g¯i,j = 1}
the set of players that are directly connected to i. The eﬀort level of i's direct neighbors
can then be written as yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. We will drop the subscript of yi when it is clear
from the context. Given a network g, g + gi,j and g− gi,j have the following interpretation.
When gi,j = 0 in g, g + gi,j adds the link gi,j = 1, while if gi,j = 1 in g, then g + gi,j = g.
Similarly, if gi,j = 1 in g, g− gi,j deletes the link gi,j, while if gi,j = 0 in g, then g− gi,j = g.
The network is said to be empty and denoted by g¯e if g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N and complete and
denoted by g¯c if g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ N.
Payoﬀs of player i under strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) are given by
Πi(s) = pi(xi, yi)− ηi(g)k,
where k denotes the cost of extending a link. The assumptions on the payoﬀ function are
as in the one-sided speciﬁcation. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle s∗=(x∗,g∗) such
that
Πi(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ Πi(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N .
Denote the directed equilibrium network by g∗ and the undirected equilibrium network
by g¯∗. Social welfare is again deﬁned as the sum of individual payoﬀs. For any strategy
proﬁle s, social welfare is given by
W (s) =
∑
i∈N Πi(s).
A proﬁle s˜ is socially eﬃcient if W (˜s) ≥ W (s), ∀s ∈S.
5.2 Analysis
Note that in the main part of the paper we assume the network to be ﬁxed for Proposition
1, Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 and therefore these results do not depend on the
speciﬁcation of link formation. Similarly, for the eﬃciency result in Proposition 8, the link
formation process is not relevant and the result from the two-sided case carries over. Note,
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however, that the cost for a link in the one-sided case is k, while in the two-sided speciﬁcation
it is 2k and the respective bounds have to be adjusted accordingly. We start by showing
that in any NE there can be at most one link between any pair of players.
Lemma 7: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), there is at most one directed link between any pair
of agents i, j ∈ N.
Proof. Assume that s∗=(x∗,g∗) is a Nash equilibrium and that gi,j = gj,i = 1. But then
i can proﬁtably deviate by cutting the link to j, such that gi,j = 0. Gross payoﬀs remain
unchanged, while i's linking total cost decrease by k. Q.E.D.
In Lemma 8 we show, again using the convexity of the value function, that in any Nash
equilibrium, if i extends a link to l, then i must also be connected to agent k, for any k such
that x∗k ≥ x∗l . Note that we do not require that i extends a link to k, but only that i and k
are connected. That is, it may be agent k extending the link to agent i.
Lemma 8: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), if g∗i,l = 1 then g¯
∗
i,k = 1 ∀k : x∗k ≥ x∗l .
Proof. For g∗i,j = 1 to be part of a NE, it must be that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j −
x∗l ) ≥ k . Assume, contrary to the above statement, that g¯∗i,k = 0 for some k with x∗k ≥ x∗l .
This, however, can not be a NE, since i then ﬁnds it proﬁtable to extend a link to agent k.
To see this, note that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j +xk)−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j)−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j−
x∗l ) ≥ k, where the inequalities follow from the convexity of the value function. We have
reached a contradiction and therefore g¯∗i,k = 1 for all agents k with x
∗
k ≥ x∗l . Q.E.D.
The following Lemma shows that if i extends a link to l, then any agent k with a higher
or equal eﬀort level than i must also be connected to l. Again this follows from the convexity
of the value function.
Lemma 9: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), if g∗i,l = 1 then g¯
∗
k,l = 1 ∀k : x∗k ≥ x∗i .
Proof. For g∗i,j = 1 to be part of a NE, it must be that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j −
x∗l ) ≥ k . Assume, contrary to the above statement, that g¯∗k,l = 0 for some k with x∗k ≥
x∗i . Note next that, for x
∗
k ≥ x∗i to hold we must have
∑
j∈Nk(g¯) x
∗
j ≥
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j , which
follows directly from strict strategic complementarities. Therefore, v(
∑
j∈Nk(g) x
∗
j + x
∗
l ) −
v(
∑
j∈Nk(g) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j − xl) ≥ k, where the inequalities follow
from the convexity of the value function and we have reached a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Similar to the two-sided speciﬁcation, we again deﬁne two bounds, k1 and k2. In Propo-
sition 9 we show that for k smaller than k1, the unique Nash equilibrium is such that the
network is complete, while for k larger or equal than k1, there exists a Nash equilibrium
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such that the network is empty. Proposition 10 shows that for linking cost larger than k2,
the unique Nash equilibrium is such that the network is empty, while for k smaller or equal
to k2, there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the network is complete. Note that the
thresholds k1 and k2 are deﬁned diﬀerently from the two-sided speciﬁcation. Due to the
convexity of the value function, the most proﬁtable deviation in the empty network is to
extend a link to all remaining agents (where no agent other than the deviating agent adjust
his eﬀort level). The second threshold, k2, is the maximal linking cost that can be sustained
in the complete network. Due to the convexity of the value function the agent with the
fewest incoming links has the greatest incentives to deviate. That is, the network that may
sustain the maximum linking cost is the one where incoming and outgoing links are evenly
distributed. With n agents there are n(n−1)
2
pairs of agents. For n odd this implies that when
incoming and outgoing links are evenly distributed, each agent has n−1
2
incoming and n−1
2
outgoing links. For n even, n
2
agents have n
2
incoming and n−2
2
outgoing links and n
2
agents
have n−2
2
incoming and n
2
outgoing links. For simplicity we assume in the following that n
is odd. Analogous results are easily derived for n even.
Deﬁnition 2: k1 = v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 and k
2 = 2
n−1(v((n− 1)x∗(gc))− v(n−12 x∗(gc)).
Proposition 9: If k < k1, then the unique NE network is the complete network. If
k ≥ k1, then there exists a NE such that the network is empty.
Proof. If k < k1 then an agent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to create a link to all remaining n− 1
agents in an empty network, since average payoﬀs per link are given by v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 with
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 > k. This is the most proﬁtable deviation in an empty network, due to the
convexity of the value function. Assume there exists a g∗ /∈ {ge,gc} with k < k1. Consider
the deviation of an agent i, with ηi(g¯
∗) < n−1, who links to all agents he is not connected to
in g∗, i.e., k /∈ Ni(g¯∗). To simplify notation, we write ηi for ηi(g¯∗) in the following. Average
marginal payoﬀs per link of proposed deviation are given by
v(
∑
j∈Ni\{i} x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )
n−1−ηi .
We can now write
v(
∑
j∈Ni\{i} x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )
n−1−ηi >
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(ηix¯(0))
n−1−ηi .
To see that the inequality holds, note ﬁrst that
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j > ηix¯(0), since x¯(0) is the
eﬀort level of a singleton and connected agents display strictly larger eﬀort levels in any
NE. Second, that
∑
j∈Ni\{i} x
∗
j −
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≥ (n− 1− ηi)x¯(0). That is, when linking to
the remaining n − 1 − ηi agents in proposed deviation, the minimum additional eﬀort level
accessed is given by (n− 1− ηi)x¯(0). The condition above then follows from the convexity
of the value function. Note next that
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v((n−1)x¯(0))−v((ηix¯(0))
n−1−ηi >
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1
also holds, again from the convexity of the value function, and we therefore have
v(
∑
j∈Ni\{i} x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )
n−1−ηi >
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 > k.
Therefore, if k < k1, a proﬁtable deviation exists in any g∗ 6= gc. It is easy to see that
there then exists a NE with g∗ = gc for k < k1. If, on the other hand k ≥ k1, then no agent
can proﬁtably deviate in the empty network, and a NE exists such that g∗ = ge. Q.E.D.
Before proceeding to Proposition 10, we show that in any Nash equilibrium such that the
network is neither empty nor complete, there exists an agent that extends at least one link
and has less than n−1
2
incoming links. This result is useful when proving that the network that
can be sustained at the highest linking cost is the complete network with evenly distributed
incoming links.
Lemma 10: In any NE network that is neither empty nor complete, there exists an
agent with ηi(g) ≥ 1 and ηi(g¯)− ηi(g) < n−12 .
Proof. We discern two cases. First, every agent extends at least one link and receives
at least n−1
2
links. That is, ηi(g) ≥ 1 and ηi(g¯)− ηi(g) ≥ n−12 ∀i ∈ N. But then there are at
least n(n−1)
2
links in the network and the network is complete. Second, not everyone extends
a link. Assume there are k < n agents who extend a link. Since there are no incoming
links from the remaining n − k agents, the maximum number of incoming links among the
k agents extending a link is given by k(k−1)
2
. That is, on average an agent has k−1
2
incoming
links. The maximum of the minimum number of incoming links is therefore given by k−1
2
(if the network among the k agents is complete and incoming links are distributed evenly).
Since k < n, there must be one agent with at most k−1
2
< n−1
2
incoming links who extends a
link. Q.E.D.
Proposition 10: If k > k2, then the unique NE is the empty network. If k ≤ k2, then
there exists a NE such that the network is complete.
Proof. We will ﬁrst show that the highest cost that can be sustained under the complete
network is given by k2. Denote the NE eﬀort level in a complete network with xc∗. In the
complete network the agent extending the highest number of links (and therefore receiving
the fewest number of links) is the one with the highest incentives to delete his links. To see
this, write
v((n−1)xc∗)−v((n−1−h)xc∗)
n−1−h >
v((n−1)xc∗)−v((n−1−h′)xc∗)
n−1−h′ ,
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where h′ > h > 0. The inequality holds by the convexity of the value function. The
network that minimizes the maximum number of links extended by agents in a network
is such that each agent extends n−1
2
links (and receives n−1
2
links). Therefore, the highest
linking cost that can be sustained in a complete network are given by k = k2. It is easy to
see that for k < k2 there exists a NE such that g¯∗ = g¯c. Assume next, and contrary to
the above statement, that for k > k2 there exists a NE such that g¯∗ 6= g¯e. k2 was derived
as the maximal payoﬀs sustainable in a complete network, and therefore for k > k2, there
does not exist a NE such that g¯∗ = g¯c. Next, we show that for k > k2 there also does not
exist a NE with g¯∗ /∈ {g¯e, g¯c}. Assume the contrary. Pick an agent with less than n−1
2
incoming links, ηi(g¯
∗)− ηi(g∗) < n−12 , and at least one outgoing link, ηi(g∗) ≥ 1. We know
from Lemma 8 that such an agent exists in g¯∗ /∈ {g¯e, g¯c}. We consider a deviation where
this agent deletes all his links. To see that the deviation considered is proﬁtable, note that
in the complete network the average marginal payoﬀ from extending links to all remaining
agents is larger for an agent with n−1
2
incoming links, than for an agent with fewer incoming
links, i.e., for an agent withηi(g¯
∗) − ηi(g∗) < n−12 . From ηi(g¯∗) − ηi(g∗) < n−12 we have
n− 1− (ηi(g¯∗)− ηi(g∗)) > n−12 . The following inequality then holds, again by the convexity
of v,
v((n−1)xc∗)−v(n−1
2
xc∗)
n−1
2
> v((n−1)x
c∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
n−1−(ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗)) .
Note that, given ηi(g¯
∗) − ηi(g∗) < n−12 incoming links, average marginal payoﬀs are
highest when linking to all remaining agents with eﬀort level xc∗. As ηi(g¯∗) is at most n− 1,
we can write
v((n−1)xc∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
n−1−(ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗)) ≥
v(ηi(g¯
∗)xc∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
ηi(g∗)
.
Finally, note that by Lemma 2 eﬀort levels are maximal in the complete component and
by the convexity of v we can therefore write
v(ηi(g¯
∗)xc∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
ηi(g∗)
>
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g∗) x
∗
j )
ηi(g∗)
.
Average marginal payoﬀs are highest in the complete network where each agent extends
n−1
2
links and therefore for k > k2 the empty network is the unique NE network. Q.E.D.
Lemma 11 shows that k1 < k2. We have therefore shown that, for linking cost smaller
than k1, the unique NE is the complete network, while, for linking cost larger than k2, the
unique NE network is the empty network. For linking cost k ∈ [k1, k2] the complete and
the empty network are Nash equilibria.
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Lemma 11: 0 < k1 < k2.
Proof. Recall the deﬁnitions of k1 = v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 and k
2 =
2(v((n−1)xc∗)−v((n−1
2
)xc∗))
n−1 .
The inequalities then follow from x¯(0) > 0, xc∗ > x¯(0) and the convexity of the value
function. Q.E.D.
The following Lemma shows that in any Nash equilibrium, if a pair of agents exert same
eﬀort levels, then they must share the same neighborhoods. The proof is a direct consequence
of the convexity of the value function.
Lemma 12: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), x∗i = x
∗
k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. First, Ni(g¯
∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i} ⇒ x∗i = x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then i and k access
the same eﬀort level, i.e., yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j = yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and therefore x
∗
i = x
∗
k.
Assume next that g¯∗i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality that x
∗
i > x
∗
k. But then k accesses
a higher eﬀort level than i, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j , and we have reached a
contradiction. Second, x∗i = x
∗
k ⇒ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}. Assume to the contrary that
x∗i = x
∗
k and Ni(g¯
∗)\{k} 6= Nk(g¯∗)\{i}. Note that for x∗i = x∗k, eﬀort levels accessed must be
equal by strict strategic complementarities, so that yi = yk. For Ni(g¯
∗) \ {k} 6= Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}
to hold, there must exist an agent l, such that l ∈ Nk(g¯∗) and l /∈ Ni(g¯∗). For the link g¯∗k,l = 1
to be in place in g¯∗ we must have that v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j −x∗l ) ≥ k. But from
yi = yk and the convexity of the value function v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j + xl) − v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) >
v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k holds and we reach a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 13 shows that in any Nash equilibrium, if an agent i exerts a weakly lower eﬀort
level than another agent k, then agent i's neighborhood is contained in k's neighborhood.
Lemma 13: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. First, Ni(g¯
∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i} ⇒ x∗i ≤ x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then k accesses a
weakly higher eﬀort level, i.e., yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≤ yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and therefore x
∗
i ≤ x∗k.
Assume next that g¯∗i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality, that x
∗
i > x
∗
k. But then k accesses
a strictly higher eﬀort level than i, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j , and we have
reached a contradiction. Second, x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇒ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}. Assume to the
contrary that x∗i ≤ x∗k and there exists an agent l such that l ∈ Ni(g¯∗) and l /∈ Nk(g¯∗).
For the link g¯∗i,l = 1 to be in place in g¯
∗, either g∗i,l = 1 or g
∗
l,i = 1. If g
∗
i,l = 1, then
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k must hold. But from yi ≤ yk and the convexity
of the value function can write v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j + xl) − v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) −
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k and we have reached a contradiction. We can apply an analogous
argument for g∗l,i = 1. Q.E.D.
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In Proposition 11 we show that all Nash equilibria are nested split graphs.
Proposition 11: In any NE the network is a nested split graph.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the complete and the empty network are nested split graphs.
We start by showing that in any NE, if dk(g¯
∗) ≥ dl(g¯∗), then x∗k ≥ x∗l . Assume to the
contrary that x∗l > x
∗
k. We distinguish two cases. First, dk(g¯
∗) > dl(g¯∗). Then there
exists an agent m ∈ Nk(g¯∗) and m /∈ Nl(g¯∗). Distinguish two subcases. First, agent m
extends a link to k and g∗m,k = 1. But then, by x
∗
l > x
∗
k and Lemma 8, g¯
∗
m,l = 1 and
we have reached a contradiction. Second, agent k extends a link to m and g∗k,m = 1. But
then, by Lemma 9, g¯∗l,m = 1 must hold and we have reached a contradiction. Assume next
that dk(g¯
∗) = dl(g¯∗). If Nk(g¯∗) \ {l} = Nl(g¯∗) \ {k}, then x∗k = x∗l by Lemma 12 and we
have reached a contradiction. If Nk(g¯
∗) \ {l} 6= Nl(g¯∗) \ {k}, then there exists an agent
m ∈ Nk(g¯∗) \ {l} and m /∈ Nl(g¯∗) \ {k}. The argument that, in fact, m ∈ Nl(g¯∗) \ {k} is
analogous to the previous case and we again reach a contradiction. We have established that
in any NE, if dk(g¯
∗) ≥ dl(g¯∗), then x∗k ≥ x∗l . Next we show that in any NE, if g¯∗i,l = 1
and dk(g¯
∗) ≥ dl(g¯∗) (and therefore x∗k ≥ x∗l ), then g¯∗i,k = 1. We distinguish two cases. First,
g∗i,l = 1. Then, by Lemma 8 g¯
∗
i,k = 1. Second, g
∗
l,i = 1. Then, by Lemma 9 g¯
∗
i,k = 1. That is,
g¯∗ is a nested split graph. Q.E.D.
We know from the literature in graph theory that nested split graphs are core-periphery
networks (split graphs).16 Below, we provide a separate proof, which highlights agent's
incentives of linking and exerting eﬀort. Furthermore, a relationship between a property of
the NE eﬀort levels and NE network structure is established.
Corollary 3: In any NE
• if x∗i = x∗j ∀i, j ∈ N, then the network is either empty or complete,
• if x∗i 6= x∗j for some i, j ∈ N, then the network is a core-periphery network (that is
neither complete nor empty).
Proof. Lemma 9 directly implies that the only networks such that x∗i = x
∗
j ∀i, j ∈ N are
the empty and the complete network. Next, we show that in any NE such that there exists
a pair of agents i and j, such that x∗i 6= x∗j , the network displays a core-periphery structure
(other than the complete or empty network). Rank agents by their eﬀort levels in increasing
order, such that x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤ ... ≤ x∗n−1 ≤ x∗n. We know from Lemma 1 that the network is
not complete, since there exists a pair of agents i and j such that x∗i 6= x∗j . The network is
not empty, as agents have identical payoﬀ functions and singleton agents display same eﬀort
16See, for example, Mahadev and Peled (1995)
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levels, x¯(0). We start by showing that the two lowest ranked agents, agent 1 and agent 2,
are not connected. Two cases are to be discerned. First, g∗1,2 = 1. From Lemma 8 we know
that agent 1 must be connected to all agents remaining agents, since x∗j ≥ x∗2 ∀j ≥ 2. Lemma
13 implies that the network is complete since Ni(g
∗) \ {j} ⊆ Nj(g∗) \ {i} holds for agents
j with x∗j ≥ x∗1 ∀j ≥ 1. But then x∗i = x∗j ∀i, j ∈ N by Lemma 1 and we have reached a
contradiction. Second, g∗2,1 = 1. From Lemma 9 we know that agent 1 is connected to all
agents, since x∗j ≥ x∗2 ∀j ≥ 2 and the above argument applies. Since the network is neither
empty, nor complete, at least one link exists. Pick the agent i with the lowest subscript
that is involved in a link and, if i is involved in more than one link, consider the link to the
agent with the lowest subscript j. We discern two cases, g∗i,j = 1 and g
∗
j,i = 1. First, g
∗
i,j = 1.
We can discern two subcases. First, agent i and j are adjacent. As i is the agent with the
lowest subscript involved in a link, all agents with lower subscripts have no links. All agents
with a subscript higher or equal to i are connected to each other. To see this, note that by
Lemma 8, agent i is connected to all agents with a subscript higher or equal than j. But then
by Lemma 13, g¯∗l,m = 1 ∀l,m ≥ i. The periphery, P (g∗), consists of agents with subscripts
k < i, while the core, C(g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ i. The argument for the
case where g∗j,i = 1 is analogous. Assume next that i and j are not adjacent. Note that
since g∗i,j = 1 and from x
∗
i ≤ x∗j−1, we know by Lemma 9 that the link between j − 1 and j,
g¯∗j−1,j = 1, also exists. Next, check for the link g¯
∗
j−2,j−1. If g¯
∗
j−2,j−1 = 0, then by Lemma 9 no
agent with a subscript lower than j− 2 is connected to j− 1. Furthermore, no pair of agents
with subscripts of lower or equal than j− 2 is connected. Assume to the contrary that there
exists a pair of nodes l,m with l ≤ m < j − 2 and g¯∗l,m = 1. By Lemma 8 we must then
have that g¯∗l,j−1 = 1. This, however, contradicts Lemma 3, since g¯
∗
j−2,j−1 = 0. The periphery,
P (g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k < j, while the core, C(g∗), consists of agents with
subscripts k ≥ j. If g¯∗j−2,j−1 = 1, check for the link g¯∗j−3,j−2. If g¯∗j−3,j−2 = 0, then by above
argument the periphery, P (g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k < j − 1, while the core,
C(g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ j − 1. If g¯∗j−3,j−2 = 1, proceed in descending
order until a pair of adjacent agents is found that is not connected and deﬁne the core and
periphery accordingly. Note that such a pair of agents exists, since i and j were assumed to
not be adjacent and therefore g¯∗i,i+1 = 0. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
In Proposition 12 we show that in anyNE such that two agents have diﬀerent eﬀort levels,
there exists a core-periphery partition such that agents in the core exert strictly higher eﬀort
levels and obtain strictly higher gross payoﬀs.
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Proposition 12: In any NE with a pair of agents i and j, such that x∗i 6= x∗j , there
exists a core-periphery partition of agents, such that x∗i > x
∗
j and pi
∗
i > pi
∗
j ∀i ∈ C(g¯∗) and
∀j ∈ P (g¯∗).
Proof. Rank again agents by their eﬀort levels in increasing order, such that x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤
... ≤ x∗n−1 ≤ x∗n. From Proposition 11 we know that there exists an agent x∗k such that
g¯∗i−1,i = 0 ∀i ≤ k and g¯∗i,i+1 = 1 ∀i ≥ k. We discern two cases. First, x∗k = x∗k+1. Deﬁne
C(g¯∗) = {i : xi ≥ xk} and P (g¯∗) = {i : xi < xk} and assume, contrary to the above, that
x∗k−1 ≥ x∗k = x∗k+1. From Lemma 13 we know that Nk+1(g¯∗) \ {k − 1} ⊆ Nk−1(g¯∗) \ {k}
must hold. That is, if x∗k−1 ≥ x∗k+1, then all of agent k + 1's neighbors are also k − 1's
neighbors. But then, since k + 1 is connected with k, k − 1 is also connected with k and
g¯∗k−1,k = 1. We have reached a contradiction. Next, x
∗
k < x
∗
k+1. In this case simply deﬁne
C(g¯∗) = {i : xi ≥ xk+1} and P (g¯∗) = {i : xi < xk+1}. For the second part of the statement
note that from x∗i > x
∗
j we know that y
∗
i =
∑
k∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
k >
∑
k∈Nj(g¯∗) x
∗
k = y
∗
j holds. We can
then write pi(x∗j , y
∗
i ) > pi
∗
j (x
∗
j , y
∗
j ), where the inequality follows from positive externalities.
Q.E.D.
Next, we deﬁne a periphery-sponsored core-periphery network as a core-periphery network
where all agents in the periphery extend links to all agents in the core. A core-sponsored
core-periphery network is a core-periphery network where all agents in the core extend links
to all agents in the periphery.
Deﬁnition 3: A network g is a periphery− sponsored core− periphery network if the
set of agents N can be partitioned into two sets, C(g) (the core) and P (g) (the periphery),
such that g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ C(g), g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g) and gi,j = 1∀i ∈ C(g) and ∀i ∈ P (g).
A network g is a core − sponsored core − periphery network if the set of agents N can
be partitioned into two sets, C(g) (the core) and P (g) (the periphery), such that g¯i,j = 1
∀i, j ∈ C(g), g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g) and gi,j = 1∀i ∈ C(g) and ∀i ∈ P (g).
Lemma 14: There does not exist a NE such that the network is a center-sponsored star.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the center extends link to all agents in the periphery.
Note that the center extends n−1 links to agents with eﬀort level x∗p. That is, for this to be a
NE,
v((n−1)x∗p)−v(0)
n−1 ≥ k needs to hold. Furthermore, we need that an agent in the periphery
does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate by extending links to the remaining n− 2 agents in the
periphery. That is, we need k ≥ v((n−2)x∗p)−v(x∗c)
n−2 to hold. However, from Proposition 12 we
know that x∗c > x
∗
p (and therefore (n−2)x∗p+x∗c > (n−1)x∗p) and then, from the convexity of
the value function,
v((n−2)x∗p)−v(x∗c)
n−2 >
v((n−1)x∗p)−v(0)
n−1 holds. We have reached a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
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Corollary 3: For any NE star network in which the center obtains lower payoﬀs than an
agent in the periphery, there exists another NE star network with a core-periphery partition
such that the center obtains strictly higher payoﬀs than agents in the periphery .
Proof. From Lemma 14 we know that there does not exist a NE star network such
that the center extends links to all agents in the periphery. This leaves two conﬁgurations.
First, periphery-sponsored star networks and second, networks where some agents in the
periphery extend links to the center and the center, in turn, extends links to some agents in
the periphery. In a periphery-sponsored star network, payoﬀs of the center are strictly larger
than payoﬀs of an agent in the periphery. To see this, note that from Proposition 12 and
strategic complementarities we know that (n − 1)x∗p > x∗c . That is, the center's neighbors
not only exert higher eﬀort level and gross payoﬀs are therefore higher, but the center does
also not incur any linking cost. For the second case, note that some of the agents in the
periphery extend a link to the central agent. But then there exists another NE which is
a periphery-sponsored star network, for which we have just shown that payoﬀs are strictly
larger for an agent in the center. Q.E.D.
Proposition 13 presents necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a NE star
network for the linear-quadratic payoﬀ function proposed in Calvó-Armengol et al (2005 and
2009), which is given by pi(xi, yi) = xi− β2x2i +λxi
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. Note that for the existence of
a NE star network, we only need to check for periphery-sponsored stars. This follows from
Lemma 14, which shows that a center-sponsored star does not exist, and therefore in any
NE star network at least one agent in the periphery extends a link to the center. That is, if
a NE star network exists such that the central agent extends a link, then there also exists
a NE with a periphery-sponsored star network, while the converse need not hold. As in
Proposition 6, the condition for a NE on a ﬁxed network is given by n < 1+ λ
2
β2
. However, in
the one-sided link formation speciﬁcation this condition does not bind, as the upper bound
on n (presented below) is always smaller than 1+ λ
2
β2
for λ and β positive. The ﬁrst condition
of Proposition 13, β ≥ 5λ, imposes an upper bound on λ relative to β, which is independent
of k and n. That is, if the parameter governing strategic complementarities, λ, is suﬃciently
large relative to the convexity of the cost function, β, then a NE star network does not exist
(for any combination of k and n). Note next that for a NE star network to exist, linking
cost k must be in an intermediate range. The lower bound on linking cost k is given by the
marginal payoﬀs of an agent in the periphery linking to all n − 2 agents in the periphery,
while keeping his link to the center. That is, for k larger than the lower bound, an agents in
the periphery will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to the remaining agents in the periphery. The
upper bound, in turn, is given by the marginal payoﬀs of periphery linking to the center.
Therefore, for linking cost k smaller than the upper bound, an agent in the periphery does
not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to delete his links with the central agent. Note that bounds on linking
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cost k are increasing in n. The bounds on n (together with β ≥ 5λ) then ensure that the
upper bound on linking cost is, in fact, (weakly) larger than the lower bound. The last two
conditions present the knife-edge cases where the lower bound on linking cost k coincides
with the upper bound.
Proposition 13: If best response functions are linear, then a NE with a star network
exists if and only if
• β > 5λ and either

λ(β+λ)2(2β+(n−2)λ)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 ≤ k ≤ β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β and
(β−λ)2
2λ2
−
√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ4
≤ n ≤ (β−λ)2
2λ2
+
√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ4
, or

λ(β+λ)2(2β+(n−2)λ)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 = k and
(β−λ)2
2λ2
+
√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ2
= n, or
• β ≥ 5λ, β(β+λ)2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β = k and (β−λ)
2
2λ2
−
√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ2
= n.
Proof. From Lemma 14 we know that in a NE star network there must be at least
one peripheral player extending a link to the center and we can therefore focus on periphery
sponsored core-periphery networks. Note next that that in a star network, all agents in the
periphery access the same eﬀort level, x∗c , and therefore all agents in the periphery display the
same eﬀort level, x∗p. The agents in the core maximize xc ∈ argmaxxc∈Xxc−β2x2c+λxc(n−1)xp,
where xp is the eﬀort level of agents in the periphery. For an agent in the periphery we have
xp ∈argmaxxp∈Xxp− β2x2p+λxpxc. The reaction functions are given by xc(xp, xˆc) = 1+λxp(n−1)β
and xp(xc) =
1+λxc
β
, respectively. Equilibrium eﬀort levels are given by x∗c=
β+λ(n−1)
β2−λ2(n−1) and
x∗p =
β+λ
β2−λ2(n−1) . Plugging equilibrium eﬀort levels back into the payoﬀ function, yields
equilibrium gross payoﬀs of pi∗c =
β(β+λ(n−1))2
2(β2−λ2(n−1) and pi
∗
p =
β(β+λ)2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 . Next, we calculate
deviation payoﬀs of an agent in the periphery linking to all n − 2 remaining agents in the
periphery. A deviating agent maximizes xdp ∈argmaxxdp∈Xxdp− β2 (xdp)2 + λxdp(x∗c + (n− 2)x∗p),
which yields the following reaction function xdp(x
∗
c , x
∗
p) =
1+λx∗c+λx∗p(n−2)
β
. The deviation eﬀort
level is given by xdp(x
∗
c , x
∗
p) =
(β+λ)(β+λ(n−2))
β(β2−λ2(n−1)) and corresponding deviation gross payoﬀs by
pidp =
(β+λ)2(β+λ(n−2))2
2β(β2−λ2(n−1))2 . For the existence of a periphery-sponsored core-periphery network
we need two conditions to hold. First, linking cost k must be such that an agent in the
periphery does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to delete his link to the central agent and, second,
agents in the periphery do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to the remaining (n−1) agents in the
periphery, given the link to the center. The ﬁrst condition then reads β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β ≥ k,
where 1
2β
are the payoﬀs of an agent without any links. The second condition is given
by k ≥ ( (β+λ)2(β+λ(n−2))2
2β(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 )/(n − 2) = λ(β+λ)
2(2β+(n−2)λ)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 . Combining the two
inequalities one can show after some algebraic manipulation that these two conditions hold
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if and only if β > 5λ and either λ(β+λ)
2(2β+(n−2)λ)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 ≤ k ≤ β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β and (β−λ)
2
2λ2
−√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ4
≤ n ≤ (β−λ)2
2λ2
+
√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ4
or, one of two knife-edge cases, where
the upper and lower bound on k coincide, i.e. β > 5λ and λ(β+λ)
2(2β+(n−2)λ)
2β(β2−(n−1)λ2)2 = k and
(β−λ)2
2λ2
+√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ2
= n or β ≥ 5λ, β(β+λ)2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β = k and (β−λ)
2
2λ2
−
√
(β−5λ)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
4λ2
=
n.17 Q.E.D.
17The calculations were executed with Mathematica and the codes are available upon request.
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